Working paper, draft available on request
Borrowing Young, Paying Later
Abstract. Restricting credit access protects borrowers from financial mistakes, but limits the accumulation of credit history that lenders use to extend future credit. We study these competing forces using the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, which barred credit card issuance to individuals under age 21 without a cosigner or verified income. Exploiting cohort-based variation in exposure with an adjacent-cohorts design that controls for secular trends, we trace long-run credit outcomes using credit bureau data. The CARD Act reduced early card ownership and severe delinquency substantially, at the cost of a temporary credit score deficit in the early twenties. By age 30, treated individuals are 2–4 percentage points more likely to hold prime or super-prime credit scores and 5–6 percentage points more likely to own a home, but at the cost of increased mortgage delinquency. An instrumental variables decomposition reveals that protection from early delinquency drives the credit score and homeownership gains, while credit exclusion generates adverse selection into the mortgage market — borrowers who never had the opportunity to reveal their credit risk through card delinquency appear creditworthy on paper but default at elevated rates.
Keywords: Credit CARD Act, young adults, credit card access, consumer credit, credit scores, homeownership, mortgage delinquency, adverse selection, credit bureau data.
JEL codes: D14, G28, G51, K22.
In brief
Keeping young adults away from credit cards protected them from early defaults and raised their credit scores and homeownership by age 30, but led to more mortgage defaults.
The paper studies the Credit CARD Act of 2009, which barred card issuance to people under 21 without a cosigner or verified income, and follows affected cohorts into their early thirties in credit bureau data. The Act cut early card ownership and severe delinquency, at the cost of a temporary credit score deficit in the early twenties. By age 30, affected individuals were 2 to 4 percentage points more likely to have prime or super-prime scores and 5 to 6 percentage points more likely to own a home. Their mortgages defaulted more often, however: people who never had a chance to reveal their credit risk on a card looked creditworthy on paper.
| Panel A. Design | ||
|---|---|---|
| Question | Does restricting young people’s access to credit help or hurt their long-run financial outcomes? | |
| Setting | The Credit CARD Act of 2009, which barred card issuance under age 21 without a cosigner or verified income | |
| Data | FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel / Equifax, followed through age 32 | |
| Method | Adjacent-cohorts design benchmarked against placebo cohort pairs; instrumental variables decomposition | |
| Panel B. Reported effects | ||
| Card ownership at age 18 | −22 pp | |
| Severe card delinquency through the mid-twenties | −5 to −15 pp | |
| Prime or super-prime credit score at age 30 | +2 to 4 pp | |
| Homeownership at age 30 | +5 to 6 pp | |
| Severe delinquency among mortgage holders | +7.4 pp | |
Summarized from the paper. See the paper for exact estimates and specifications.
Read and cite
The draft is not yet posted. Email for a copy.
Cole, Allison, Rawley Z. Heimer, and Igor Livshits. “Borrowing Young, Paying Later.” Working paper.
@unpublished{heimer2026borrowing,
author = {Cole, Allison and Heimer, Rawley Z. and Livshits, Igor},
title = {Borrowing Young, Paying Later},
note = {Working paper},
year = {2026},
url = {https://rawleyheimer.com/papers/borrowing-young-paying-later.html}
}
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