Journal of Financial Economics 132 (3): 1–21
Should Retail Investors’ Leverage Be Limited?
Lead article. Best Paper Finalist in Asset Pricing, SFS Cavalcade.
Abstract. Does the provision of leverage to retail traders improve market quality or facilitate socially inefficient speculation that enriches financial intermediaries? We evaluate the effects of 2010 regulations that cap leverage in the U.S. retail foreign exchange market. Using three unique data sets and a difference-in-differences approach, we document that the leverage constraint reduces trading volume by 23%, alleviates high-leverage traders’ losses by 40%, and reduces brokerages’ operating capital by 25%. Yet, the policy does not affect the relative bid-ask prices charged by the brokerages. These results suggest the policy improves belief-neutral social welfare without reducing market liquidity.
Keywords: leverage limits, retail forex trading, Dodd-Frank, speculation, financial regulation, market liquidity, brokerages, difference-in-differences.
JEL codes: D84, G11, G12, G18, G24.
In brief
Capping how much leverage retail traders can use made them better off without harming market liquidity.
The paper studies 2010 U.S. rules that limited leverage in the retail foreign exchange (forex) market. The cap cut trading volume by 23%, reduced high-leverage traders’ losses by 40%, and shrank brokerages’ operating capital by 25%, yet brokerages did not raise the bid-ask spreads they charged. The authors conclude that the policy improved (belief-neutral) social welfare without reducing market liquidity.
| Panel A. Design | ||
|---|---|---|
| Question | Does giving retail traders access to leverage improve market quality, or does it mainly fund speculation that enriches intermediaries? | |
| Setting | 2010 U.S. regulations capping leverage in the retail foreign exchange market | |
| Data | Three unique data sets | |
| Method | Difference-in-differences | |
| Panel B. Reported effects of the leverage cap | ||
| Trading volume | −23% | |
| Losses of high-leverage traders | −40% | |
| Brokerages’ operating capital | −25% | |
| Relative bid-ask prices charged by brokerages | No effect | |
Summarized from the paper. See the paper for exact estimates and specifications.
Read and cite
- Published version, Journal of Financial Economics
- Working paper version, SSRN
- Accepted manuscript (open access), MIT DSpace
- Earlier version, NBER Working Paper 24176
- DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.10.017
Heimer, Rawley Z., and Alp Simsek. 2019. “Should Retail Investors’ Leverage Be Limited?” Journal of Financial Economics 132 (3): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.10.017.
@article{heimer2019leverage,
author = {Heimer, Rawley Z. and Simsek, Alp},
title = {Should Retail Investors' Leverage Be Limited?},
journal = {Journal of Financial Economics},
volume = {132},
number = {3},
pages = {1--21},
year = {2019},
doi = {10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.10.017},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X18303076}
}
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