Research › Legal and regulatory institutions
Legal and regulatory institutions
How courts, regulators, and politics shape credit markets and what consumers get from them: contract enforcement and long-run development on Native American reservations, political interference in fair-lending enforcement, and how complaints to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau turn into restitution.
Related terms: contract enforcement, Public Law 280, tribal courts, financial development, regulatory enforcement, political interference, fair-lending enforcement, CFPB, consumer complaints, restitution and redress.
Published papers
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Journal of Financial Economics
When a state’s senator becomes a powerful committee chair, credit access in the state’s minority neighborhoods falls by 7.5%.
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Journal of Financial Economics
People who grow up without local banks enter credit markets later and, as adults, have lower credit scores and more delinquent accounts.
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Law and Finance Matter: Lessons from Externally Imposed Courts
Review of Financial Studies
Reservations assigned to state courts, which enforce contracts more predictably, have stronger credit markets and higher incomes.
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World Bank Economic Review
Reservations under state courts grew faster over the long run than similar reservations whose tribal courts enforced contracts less predictably.
Working papers
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Fallible Firms: The Economics of Consumer Redress
Whether consumers get money back after complaining about a financial firm depends more on who complains than on which firm is involved.